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Research Question/ Issue: Which forms of state control over corporations have emerged in 
countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based economies and what 
are their implications for corporate governance? We assess the literature on variation and 
evolution of state control in transition economies focusing on corporate governance of state-
controlled firms. We highlight emerging trends and identify future research avenues. 
Research Findings/ Insights: Based on our analysis of more than a hundred articles in 
leading management, finance and economics journals since 1989, we demonstrate how 
research on state control evolved from a polarized approach of public – private equity 
ownership comparison to studying a variety of constellations of state capitalism. 
Theoretical/ Academic Implications: We identify theoretical perspectives that help us better 
understand benefits and costs associated with various forms of state control over firms. We 
encourage future studies to examine how context-specific factors determine the effect of state 
control on corporate governance.  
Practitioner/ Policy Implications: Investors and policy-makers should consider under which 
conditions investing in state-affiliated firms generates superior returns.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over a quarter of a century since the fall of the Berlin Wall, former communist regimes have 
transitioned to democratic or semi-democratic regimes, although the process of becoming 
market economies has advanced at different rates and directions across countries. Transition 
economies represent a large sub-category of emerging economies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
Wright, 2000; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013). Given the 25 years since 1989, 
it is timely to review how means of state control have changed in these transition economies.  
While developed economies have seen a gradual demise of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and there has been extensive privatization in emerging economies, state capitalism is 
a popular choice among transition economies (Wooldridge, 2012). Accordingly, we address 
the following research question: “Which forms of state control over corporations have 
emerged in countries that made a transition from centrally-planned to marked-based 
economies and what are their implications for corporate governance?” To address this 
question, we suggest a taxonomy of state control used to structure our literature review.  
We consider the transformation of state control in transition economies focusing on 
the emergence of contemporary forms of state capitalism following privatizations of the 
1990s. Earlier reviews focused on privatization comparing performance of state-owned and 
privatized companies (Estrin & Wright, 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002), but interactions between state and private sector have evolved and new forms 
of state control have emerged. Our motivation is driven by a lack of comprehensive reviews 
encompassing the evolution and variety of state control over firms and their governance 
implications. We fill this gap by bringing together studies scattered across several disciplines 
and identifying relevant theoretical perspectives that suggest positive and negative effects of 
state control, as summarized in Table 1. 
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
We searched for studies that examine state control and corporate governance of firms 
in transition economies. The first category of studies considered various mechanisms of state 
control: partial ownership, board of directors, veto rights, managerial incentives, loans, and 
regulation. The second category analyzed relationships between state control and corporate 
governance. We did not cover studies about performance implications of state control, these 
implications have been discussed by Musacchio Lazzarini, and Aguilera (2015). 
We analyzed more than a hundred articles published since 1989 focusing on peer-
reviewed studies (Seglen, 1994; Pugliese, Bezemer, Zattoni, Huse et al., 2009), but also 
included in our review books and book chapters containing significant empirical material. We 
did not review studies about traditional SOEs with state as the sole shareholder — such 
enterprises were covered by earlier reviews on privatization (Megginson & Netter, 2001). 
Instead we focused on partial state ownership and indirect state ownerships via 
intermediaries. We generally refer to such firms as SOEs. Key studies representing different 
theoretical perspectives and different transition economies are shown in Table 2. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
We adopt a broad definition of ‘transition economies’ to include former socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, former republics of the Soviet Union, and Asian 
countries emerging from a socialist-type command economy towards a market-based 
economy (China, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Vietnam). Many of these economies have 
Page 3 of 45 Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
4 
 
completed transition to a market economy. The countries that joined the EU - Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, 
followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and Croatia in 2013, are no longer in transition.   
We mainly focus on the two largest transition economies, China and Russia (drawing 
some comparisons with smaller transition economies), because of the economic and political 
importance of SOEs in these countries and because studies overwhelmingly relate to these 
two countries (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan et al., 2015; Musacchio et al., 2015). Comparing 
China and Russia helps identify context-specific factors affecting corporate governance of 
state-controlled companies. Timelines of the main events affecting state control and corporate 
governance in China and Russia are shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we outline a range of forms of state control 
going beyond dominant ownership positions, including government loans, appointments of 
state officials to board or top management positions, party committees, special veto rights, 
regulation, and business-government networks, and consider how these have evolved over 
time in China, Russia and other transition economies. Second, we review the literature on 
governance structures and processes with particular attention to board composition and 
independence, transparency and disclosure, and executive compensation in state-controlled 
firms operating in transition economies. Finally, we elaborate an agenda for future research 
on corporate governance implications of state control taking into account the variety of 
transition economies.   
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MEANS OF STATE CONTROL: VARIATION AND EVOLUTION OVER TIME 
Over the last 25 years, public perception and academic reasoning about the role of state in 
transition economies have fluctuated sharply. During the early 90s, the pro-market and anti-
state climate reigned following the collapse of communist regimes. Research on SOEs in 
transition economies during our focal period started with privatization studies (Aharoni, 
1986; Ramamurti & Vernon, 1991; Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Estrin & Wright, 1999). These 
studies viewed SOEs as a temporary organizational form because privatization of SOEs was 
widely anticipated (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). In the 
second half of the 1990s, initial euphoria over privatization in planned economies began to 
wane as the hard work of enterprise restructuring continued. Since mid-2000s, the pace of 
privatization and deregulation has slowed. During this period, private investors were often 
offered minority stakes, with the state keeping a controlling stake. A new form of state 
capitalism developed, influenced by increasing globalization and market-orientation. To 
address this transformation, a more recent literature emerged devoted to partial state 
ownership (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013) and other forms of state control. As the 
overwhelming majority of studies about state control have been conducted in China (Bruton 
et al., 2015), we begin by reviewing these studies and then consider studies about state 
control in Russia and other transition economies. 
Variation and Evolution of State Control in China 
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. China took a reform approach of ‘gradualism’ 
(Wang, Guthrie, & Xiao, 2011), preserving state control while implementing new 
institutional forms. In the 1980s, China decentralized state control to provincial, municipal, 
township and village level governments, at the same time allowing private sector emergence. 
During the 1990s reforms, China’s state vowed to “hold onto the big and let go of the small” 
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(zhua da fang xiao) (Fernandez & Fernandez-Stembridge, 2007). As a result, China 
developed a complex system of state ownership with elaborated control mechanisms (Delios, 
Wu, & Zhou, 2006). The Chinese state retained stakes (often non-controlling) in privatized 
medium-sized SOEs and imposed restrictions on non-state share transfers. Large SOEs 
remained under government control, but some were partly privatized later (Cao, Qian, & 
Weingast, 1999). Gradualism had two benefits. First, it allowed the state to retain its 
stabilizing role. Second, the central government pushed ownership control down to localities, 
creating an incentive structure similar to those experienced by managers of large industrial 
firms.  
Continuing central government commitment to support employment in SOEs implied 
state-owned banks usually bailed out loss-making SOEs, creating ‘soft budget’ constraints 
(Zhu, 2012). This strategy resulted in “reform without losers” (Lau, Qian, & Roland, 2000) 
and helped minimize social instability and reduce resistance to reform. In contrast, central 
government had no commitment to support employment in township and village enterprises 
(TVEs). Thus, TVEs faced a much tighter budget constraint and stronger market discipline 
than SOEs controlled by central government. However, from the mid-1990s, central 
government progressively reduced commitment to support employment in SOEs, and many 
small and medium-sized SOEs went bankrupt or were privatized. More diversified ownership 
was introduced with some larger SOEs being converted into shareholding companies, with 
majority of shares controlled by the state.  
This restructuring led to productivity growth and a decline in SOEs’ share of labor 
(Zhu, 2012). The Chinese government aimed at selectively fortifying SOE presence in 
specific industries (Nolan, 2001) and in developing SOEs into globally competitive firms 
(Ralston, Terpstra‐Tong, Terpstra, Wang et al., 2006). In 2000, China launched its ‘Go 
Global’ policy, establishing some SOEs as ‘national champions’ and leading to SOEs 
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globalization (Thun, 2004; Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2015). SOEs’ culture became close to those of 
privately and foreign-owned businesses (Granrose, Huang, & Reigadas, 2000). However, the 
Chinese government did not desire to completely eradicate former hierarchical structures.  
A key ingredient of reforms was ‘corporatization’ of SOEs which meant that they fell 
under the jurisdiction of the 1994 Company Law, aimed at promoting corporate property 
rights and corporate governance structures. Corporatized SOEs were subsequently listed on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006) to access private and 
foreign capital. Moreover, China started the split-share structural reform in 2006 as a part of 
its program to transfer state shares in SOEs to private investors (Haveman & Wang, 2013) 
and to transform the corporate governance model from administrative to more market-
oriented (Ralston et al., 2006). Typically, when a Chinese SOE was listed, only a small 
proportion of equity was sold to private investors (Conyon & He, 2011) with the state and 
parent SOEs keeping voting control. Sheng and Zhao (2013) show that recently the “state 
advance and private retreat” phenomenon (guo jin min tui) has been gaining ground — 
China’s government has strengthened control over SOEs with private capital being forced to 
withdraw from major industries, especially those related to national security. 
Indirect State Ownership Control. The state maintained indirect control after 
corporatization as state shares were ‘placed’ in the State-Owned Asset Management 
Companies (SOAMCs); and under the control of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), charged with transforming and controlling the largest 
and most powerful of SOEs. SASAC was also responsible for appointing and removing top 
executives at SOEs, setting executive compensation, improving corporate governance and 
setting SOEs’ operating budgets and ensuring workplace safety at SOEs (Jiang & Kim, 
2015). From 1998 to 2003 shares directly owned by the state declined from 67.3 percent to 
23.5 percent, while state institutional shares (owned by SOAMCs/ SASAC) rose from 1.8 
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percent to 44.4 percent (Wang et al., 2011). Researchers still have to explore how much 
autonomy SOAMCs enjoy. 
Means of Control beyond Ownership. In transition economies the state often 
supported and influenced distressed firms through soft budgets (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). 
In China, the state responded to the 2008 global financial crisis with a monetary stimulation 
entailing internal transfers between arms of the government, banking and corporate sectors 
(Deng, Morck, Wu, & Yeung, 2015). However, monitoring of controlling shareholders by 
state banks was often inefficient with banks lending to firms even when firms’ controlling 
shareholders were tunneling resources from these firms (Qian & Yeung, 2015).  
Appointments of former or current state officials to board or top management 
positions in China were common in the 1990s. Such political ties are used by managers to 
access officials and resources (Walder, 1995). However, bureaucrats seek rents from firms 
and there is evidence of lower performance and growth in politically connected firms (Fan, 
Wong, & Zhang, 2007). Moreover, the effect on performance is contingent upon tie type. 
Political ties to local governments can improve firm survival (‘buffering’) and performance 
(‘enabling’), unlike ties to the central government (Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2014). Such 
effects are also contingent upon firm’s prior performance.  
State involvement in listed SOEs is enabled by the often overlapping dual governance 
structure: the corporate board and the Party Committee (headed by its Party Secretary). Even 
where the two structures do not overlap, real power still flows through the Party Committee, 
which often simply follows Communist Party orders (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). The 
latter also appoints CEOs of the largest SOEs.  
Networks of Private and State Actors. China’s economy is characterized as 
‘networked capitalism’, involving complex partnerships between firms and state (Boisot & 
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Child, 1996). Decentralization processes in the 1990s led to central ministries retaining 
control over larger strategic SOEs and leaving smaller SOEs under interdependent control of 
local governments and private entrepreneurs. The connections (or quanxi) with the 
bureaucracy may lead to the creation of special networks for channeling resources and 
forging mutual partner alliances between private businesses and the state (Wank, 1995). 
Start-ups may strategically appoint outside directors to seek help in dealing with government 
(Chen, 2015). State connections are associated with less severe financial constraints (Cull, Li, 
Sun, & Xu, 2015). Firms are actively looking for various means of building their business-
state networks and rendering favors to government officials, for example, by engaging in 
corporate social responsibility that promotes social welfare (Lin, Tan, Zhao, & Karim, 2015).  
Political connections helped China’s tycoons amass phenomenal wealth in real estate, 
finance, high tech and mining. In 2015, China had over 200 billionaires ranking second after 
US (Forbes, 2015). However, contrary to Russian oligarchs, China’s tycoons were mostly 
self-made, did not obtain their assets from privatizations, and were not former bureaucrats.  
Variation and Evolution of State Control in Russia 
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. Russian mass privatization in the early / mid-
1990s was radical compared with gradualism in China. Such aggressive privatization has 
been criticized as premature given weakness of the institutional infrastructure (Black, 
Kraakman, & Tarassova, 2000) and justified as the only feasible option given the political 
environment at the time (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1995). Privatization methods in Russia 
favored employees and, especially, managers leading to managerial entrenchment 
(Filatotchev, Wright, & Bleaney, 1999). Powerful positions of managers and weakness of 
corporate governance mechanisms often left the state as passive minority shareholder during 
the early reform period (Pistor & Turkewitz, 1996; Estrin & Wright, 1999). 
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Since 2000 the state has adopted a different approach by transforming selected SOEs 
into profitable, rapidly expanding industry leaders and by offering minority stakes in these 
enterprises to private investors – such investments could bring good return but minimal 
control rights. This approach allowed the state to enhance control over large strategically 
important enterprises while divesting holdings in relatively insignificant enterprises 
(Chernykh, 2011). This trend stimulated interest in the implications of dominant state 
ownership for minority investors (Yakovlev, 2009).  
Indirect State Ownership Control. State ownership of Russian companies would be 
dramatically underestimated if we considered just direct ownership (Chernykh, 2008). 
Indirect state ownership reflects the prominence of state holding companies (such as UES or 
Svyazinvest) as well as aggressive acquisition strategies of some SOEs (such as Gazprom, 
Rosneft, or VTB). Adding indirect state ownership increases the proportion of publicly listed 
companies controlled by the state from 14.1 percent to 37 percent with a conservative 50 
percent control threshold and to 57.5 percent with a 25 percent control threshold (Chernykh, 
2008). Since 2004, acquisition of substantial stakes in formerly privatized companies by large 
SOEs became a systematic practice gradually increasing the state-owned share of market 
capitalization from 20 percent in 2003 to 50 percent by 2012 (Enikolopov & Stepanov, 2013). 
These aggressive acquisition strategies of several large SOEs resulted in de facto 
renationalization of many enterprises that were privatized in the 1990s (Chernykh, 2011). 
This practice substantially boosted state control over the Russian economy even though de 
jure there was no renationalization during this period. 
Means of Control beyond Ownership. Appointment of acting government officials 
as board members and appointment of former government officials as top executives of 
companies with partial or indirect state ownership represent one means of enhancing state 
control beyond ownership. The presence of government officials on Russian boards has been 
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examined in several studies (e.g., Wright, Buck, & Filatotchev, 1998; Frye & Iwasaki, 
2011).The presence of state representatives appears persistent even when state ownership 
declines following privatization (Radygin, Entov, Gontmakher, Mezheraups et al., 2004). 
Studies of Russian firms with government board representatives provide evidence of 
collusive relationships: firms with state directors are more likely to receive state benefits and 
to provide services that benefit the state (Frye & Iwasaki, 2011).  
In the 1990s, the state often acted as a passive shareholder and rarely used the board 
as a mechanism for exercising control over management. However, in the early 2000s, the 
state became a more active shareholder and appointed senior government officials to the 
boards of SOEs. In 2011 President Medvedev initiated the removal of top government 
officials from the boards of directors of SOEs, but this initiative has recently been reversed. 
While we have systematic evidence about appointment of government officials to 
boards and their involvement in corporate governance, there are no systematic studies about 
appointment of former government officials as executives of SOEs and the implications of 
such appointments for strategic choices. It would be useful to examine systematically the 
professional background of top management teams to identify how often executives had 
government careers before assuming positions in SOEs. Another aspect of the ‘revolving 
door’ between business and government is represented by government appointments of 
prominent business leaders. This practice has not been studied systematically, but 
appointments of business leaders to key government positions were common in the 1990s 
under President Yeltsin’s administration. 
A second means of enhancing control beyond ownership occurs through veto rights 
provided by a ‘golden share’ (Frye & Iwasaki, 2011). Golden shares were frequently used in 
the 1990s but more recently the Russian government has abandoned its special voting rights 
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in some SOEs. In other firms, the government increased its stake substantially thus making 
obsolete special voting rights provided by the golden share.  
A third mechanism that allows the state to exercise influence beyond ownership is 
based on companies’ dependence on the state as a provider of resources. Thus, the state-
controlled Vneshekonombank was providing refinancing to many large “strategically 
important” companies in a critical condition after the 2008 financial crisis (Radygin, 2008). 
The recipients were expected to reciprocate by avoiding massive lay-offs, salary cuts, or 
significant increases in output prices (Simachev & Kuzyk, 2012). These de facto bailouts 
were not associated with a substantial increase in the number of SOEs (Enikolopov & 
Stepanov, 2013), but provided state agencies with significant leverage over private 
companies to demand that they avoid taking actions with high social costs.  
Fourth, regulation represents another state control channel. Limited effectiveness of 
the Russian government as a regulator is reflected not only in problems with enforcement of 
rules (Spicer & Okhmatovskiy, 2015), but also in the practice of modifying general rules to 
create favorable conditions for specific companies loyal to federal or regional governments. 
Such favoritism creates strong incentives for private companies to coordinate actions with 
government agencies to the extent that these private companies initiate large business 
transactions only after informal approval from government agencies (Radygin, 2008). SOEs 
often rely on regulatory support from the government and this practice benefits private 
shareholders investing in SOEs. However, by playing simultaneously the roles of owner and 
regulator, the state creates conflicts of interest that perpetuate the perception of market 
regulations in Russia as biased and inconsistent.  
Networks of Private and State Actors. Of particular relevance to the study of state 
control is the relationship between the Russian top politicians and industrial tycoons 
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(‘oligarchs’) (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005). When Mr. Putin came to power, he offered to 
accept oligarchs’ ownership rights obtained through the opaque privatization process if they 
did not get involved in politics (Puffer & McCarthy, 2007). Some oligarchs adapted by 
befriending the state and generating synergies from operating together (Melkumov, 2009). 
The state ‘authorized’ these tycoons to get rich and they were inclined to cooperate with the 
state (Adachi, 2013). Oligarch-owned firms were often structured as pyramids or through 
cross-shareholdings. In these structures, the oligarch achieved control of constituent firms via 
a chain of ownership relations, often including the state as another controlling shareholder. 
These oligarchic-state network structures filled the institutional vacuum left by the collapsed 
communist economy, ensuring access to the requisite resources for investments and 
improving assets’ productivity (Grosman & Leiponen, 2013). However, the power of 
oligarchs over the companies within their control also created opportunities for tremendous 
private gains, often at the expense of minority shareholders and potentially to the detriment of 
the overall economy.  
For many oligarchs, close connections to the state are rooted in their affiliation with 
nomenklatura circles through early careers or personal connections. Others started as 
‘outsiders’ but over the years developed a special relationship with the state (Braguinsky, 
2009). The oligarchs’ relationships with the state also took more formal formats as 
exemplified by official meetings of Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Putin with the group of the most 
prominent oligarchs and by establishment of a powerful lobbying association, Russian Union 
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, representing mostly interests of large business owners 
(Hanson & Teague, 2005).  
The emergence of networks where private and state actors were interconnected 
through joint ownership of partially privatized property created conditions for mutual 
influence. The balance of such influence shifted over time. In the 1990s, relationships 
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between business and the state were described as “state capture” (Hellman, Jones, & 
Kaufmann, 2003). After 2000, when political leaders gained strength and obtained broad 
public support, relationships shifted to “business capture” as political leaders leveraged their 
powerful position by dictating the conditions of continuing partnership with private actors 
(Yakovlev, 2006). 
Variation and Evolution of State Control in Other Transition Economies 
SOEs with Partial State Ownership. Research on SOEs in transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in former Soviet republics (CIS countries) has 
primarily concerned challenges associated with privatization and restructuring (Claessens & 
Djankov, 1999; Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003), governance structures (Filatotchev, Buck, 
& Zhukov, 2000), and more recently, divergent paths in transition (Lane & Myant, 2007), 
and European integration (Hashi, Welfens, & Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007).  
From the historical perspective, it is most useful to compare state control 
transformation and evolution in Russia and in other former Soviet republics. Amongst 
countries that have transitioned most towards the democratic model with the state reducing its 
control over key assets are the Baltic States (stabilized by the EU anchor), Georgia (aided by 
Western intellectual and financial support), and Kyrgyz Republic. Countries retaining 
considerable state power, where state and business elites have close ties, are Belarus, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.  
Indirect State Ownership Control.  Similar to Russia, indirect state ownership is 
quite common in CEE and CIS countries. The state often created multiple institutions through 
which to exercise control, such as investment funds or pension funds (Pahor, Prasnikar, & 
Ferligoj, 2004). The state also maintained control over some financial and industrial groups, 
which in turn controlled individual firms (Kočenda & Hanousek, 2012).  
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Means of State Control beyond Ownership. Financial support through government 
loans was common in CEE and CIS economies, similar to Russia and China (Mickiewicz, 
2010). However, in these economies, ruling political parties did not exercise direct control 
over firms through governance structures similar to China’s Party Committees. Similar to 
Russia and China, the state in other transition economies frequently executed veto rights 
through golden shares to prevent entry by new shareholders or to block the sale of property 
(Kočenda & Hanousek, 2012).  
Networks of Private and State Actors. Partial privatization in CEE produced many 
firms with mixed private and state ownership described as “recombinant property” by Stark 
(1996). Several studies analyzed privatized firms not as isolated economic units but as nodes 
in corporate networks created by the relationships of control and interdependence (Pahor et 
al., 2004). These dense corporate networks connected domestic owners, foreign owners, and 
the state thus blurring boundaries between private and state ownership. In many firms, the 
state assumed the role of a passive shareholder by letting private partners take control 
(Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski, 1999). In others, the state was quite active, with the 
relationships between state and private shareholders ranging from mutually beneficial 
cooperation to hostile battles for control. 
CEE minimized opportunities for rent-seeking activities of the ruling elite by reducing 
major distortions of government policies and liberalizing prices (Havrylyshyn, 2006). 
Oligarchs played a more prominent role in CIS countries, where they were connected with 
the state either through upper-echelon nomenclature or relatives and close associates of the 
countries’ presidents. In other former Soviet republics, the ‘revolving door’ between the 
government and business was often even more pronounced than in Russia; for example, only 
recently an oligarch in food products, Mr. Poroshenko, became President of Ukraine. Further, 
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across all CIS countries, there was considerable continuity from the political power leaders of 
the Soviet period to the oligarchs.  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
Board Composition and Independence 
The notion and functions of independent directors vary remarkably across different 
jurisdictions (Ferrarini & Filippelli, 2014). In China, all listed companies are required to have 
at least one third of independent directors on their boards and, if board committees are 
established, that proportion should be raised to at least half (Clarke, 2006; Zhao, 2011). The 
role of independent directors in Chinese audit committees is negligible (Liu & Pissler, 2013). 
As to nomination and remuneration committees, the corporate governance code recommends 
a composition based on a majority of independent directors. However, the influence of such 
committees on decisions about executive compensation is also modest. The positive 
relationship between board independence and firm operating performance is stronger in state 
controlled firms relative to other listed firms in China as it reduces tunneling and improves 
investment efficiency in SOEs (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015). Former government 
officials comprise a large share of outside board members in Chinese firms (Chen, 2015). 
Several studies examine the effect of political connections at the board level (Liang et al., 
2015; Fan et al., 2007; Zheng et al., 2014; Cull et al., 2015).  
The Russian corporate governance code recommends that boards comprise at least 
one-third of independent directors. It also recommends that audit committees consist entirely 
of independent directors or are chaired by an independent director and include only non-
executives. Board composition may affect investments in productive assets. For Russian 
publicly traded firms, Grosman and Wright (2015) find a positive effect of cash-flows on 
capital expenditures when SOEs appoint independent board directors to assume the role of 
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monitoring. However, these positive effects are substantially reduced when oligarchs appoint 
independent directors indicating that independent directors are afforded insufficient 
autonomy to play their monitoring role. The authors find foreign independent directors to be 
influential, while foreign affiliated directors exercise little influence on tunneling.  
The adoption of best corporate governance practices in state-controlled firms remains 
quite limited. According to a recent study by the Russian Institute of Directors (2014), the 
proportion of Russian SOEs with committees composed of only independent or non-
executive directors is still low (51 percent of nomination and remuneration committees and 
57 percent of audit committees). While it is common practice in SOEs to establish board 
committees, only half of them meet regularly. Only 11 percent of SOEs conducted 
evaluations of board practice in 2013. Great heterogeneity is observed between partially 
controlled SOEs and wholly owned SOEs in their board processes and practices, representing 
good standards in 74 percent of the former and only 56 percent of the latter. 
Transparency and Disclosure 
An important question concerns whether state control is associated with higher or lower 
degree of transparency and disclosure. Relative to other facets of corporate governance, 
voluntary disclosure by Russian SOEs is higher, but still lags behind the level of disclosure in 
publicly traded firms without the controlling state shareholder (Russian Institute of Directors, 
2014). Partially-owned SOEs have higher disclosure than wholly-owned SOEs. In Russia, 
SOEs are more sensitive than oligarch-owned enterprises to improved transparency as 
demonstrated by its effect on fixed investments (Grosman, 2015). Closer ties to foreign 
multinationals can improve transparency; for example, such ties lead to greater wage 
reporting in Russian companies (Braguinsky & Mityakov, 2015). 
In China, SOEs face strong incentives to voluntarily disclose additional information to 
ease investor concerns regarding management quality, the risk of tunneling, and the role of 
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government as major shareholder (Wang, Sewon, & Claiborne, 2008). However, lack of 
emphasis on efficiency and profitability by state shareholders or their direct access to 
corporate information might undermine the need for voluntary disclosure. The empirical 
results are mixed: some demonstrate that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related 
to the proportion of state ownership (Wang et al., 2008), particularly for those SOEs with 
foreign listings (Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002), while others report no significant relation 
(Huafang & Jianguo, 2007) or a negative relation between the two constructs (Xiao, Yang, & 
Chow, 2004). There are indications that China’s SOEs manage earnings to boost their 
chances of being selected for IPOs because earnings performance is a government-stated 
criterion for listing (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000).  
In China, informal institutions often substitute for ineffective formal corporate 
governance institutions (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008). Both firm owners and local 
governments are motivated to foster economic growth and both will do whatever necessary to 
achieve this. This means de facto enforcement of ownership rights and various types of 
regulation. In contrast, in Russia, formal institutions are undermined through corruption and 
lack of enforcement and government often does not have mutually complementary goals with 
large shareholders – there is oftentimes an antagonistic relationship between state and 
oligarchs with state interventions taking the form of arbitrary inspections and asset stripping 
aided by lack of court independence (Estrin & Prevezer, 2010). The Russian government 
often interferes in business affairs through selectively applying and enforcing formal rules 
toward firms and owners (Adachi, 2013).   
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Executive Compensation 
Studies of executive compensation in SOEs of transition economies are rare. The legacy of 
communism constrained CEO pay in the early stages of economic reforms (Firth et al., 2006) 
and there is generally a relatively small pay gap between organization levels in SOEs (Chen, 
Ezzamel, & Cai, 2011).The average salary of a manager in a Chinese SOE was only one-fifth 
of a manager’s salary in a foreign MNE, but this gap is closing (Wooldridge, 2012). Pay-for-
performance incentive schemes emerged as the profit objective took hold in SOEs. Average 
CEO compensation nearly doubled in the 1980s. SOEs controlled by the central government 
link CEO pay to stock returns and shareholders’ wealth, whereas SOEs controlled by local 
government base performance-related CEO pay on profitability measures (Firth et al., 2006). 
Initially studies suggested that state ownership in China is negatively associated with cash 
compensation (Firth et al., 2006; Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, & Tan, 2007; Adithipyangkul, Alon, 
& Zhang, 2009; Conyon & He, 2008). However, since a new law in 2005 encouraging SOEs 
to design incentive mechanisms to motivate managers to perform better, managers and 
directors of SOEs often receive higher compensation than their counterparts at non-SOEs 
(Jiang & Kim, 2015). 
There may be other influences on executive behavior than compensation. Executive 
positions in listed SOEs are filled by state bureaucrats rather than professional managers, and 
are steps in the career of a successful civil servant (Morck et al., 2008). For those with real 
control but little personal ownership in their company, supporting unprofitable, but politically 
important projects is a good strategy for career advancement in the state echelons. Executive 
performance evaluations and promotion decisions are oftentimes still based on whether the 
managers act in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (Firth et al., 2006). CEO 
duality in Chinese SOEs is relatively rare. The board chairman, acting as the legal 
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representative of the firm according to the Company Law, is usually appointed by the state as 
the largest shareholder (Jiang & Kim, 2015). 
In general, governments in transition economies have embraced corporate governance 
mechanisms based on shareholder rights as an alternative to direct intervention in 
management of SOEs that was a norm in centrally-planned economies. However, state-
controlled firms in transition economies often lag in adopting best corporate governance 
practices intended to protect interests of minority shareholders.  
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We summarized the range of theories used to study state control in Table 1. While this 
range is broad, agency theory (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton et al., 2008) and, more 
recently, institutional theory (Child & Juan, 1997; Suhomlinova, 1999; Puffer & McCarthy, 
2011) are the most used in the context of transition economies. Only a few recent studies on 
SOEs in transition economies rely on novel theoretical frameworks (e.g., Okhmatovskiy, 
2010; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). Further research on SOEs in transition economies 
should put more emphasis on developing theoretical frameworks that take into account 
unique challenges faced by state-controlled firms to address questions about state control and 
corporate governance summarized in Table 5. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Means of State Control 
State control over enterprises of strategic importance takes different forms and has different 
consequences as researchers have just started to explore (Musacchio et al., 2015). Modern 
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state capitalism demonstrates more sophisticated forms of state control that adapt to the 
conditions of a market-based economy. A company with substantial state ownership may 
adopt certain corporate governance mechanisms that put constraints on state involvement in 
the corporate governance process and protect interests of other shareholders. Unlike 
traditional SOEs, modern state-controlled companies in transition economies are often 
publicly traded and thus state shareholder interests must be reconciled with private 
shareholder interests, suggesting a need for further research using principal-principal agency 
theory. 
Researchers need to analyze more closely a wide variation of corporate governance 
configurations in companies under partial state control. The framework of Musacchio et al. 
(2015) examines under which conditions different forms of state control mitigate the ‘liability 
of stateness’ and lead to improved performance. While their work is conceptual, further 
research can test this framework on data from transition economies to provide fine-grained 
understanding of state control beyond the state-private dichotomy.  
Research on indirect state ownership is scarce, due to limitations of data availability 
and reliability. More research is needed to explore the shift from direct to indirect forms of 
state ownership in transition economies. In particular, growing attention has been devoted to 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) (Fotak, Gao, & Megginson, 2013; Wood & Wright, 2015; 
Aguilera, Capape, & Santiso, forthcoming) but there remains little empirical evidence 
regarding their control mechanisms as few funds disclose key organizational details. Further, 
researchers have primarily focused on the impact of SWFs on developed economies 
(Dewenter, Han, & Malatesta, 2010), with little attention to their role in emerging economies. 
Amongst transition economies, SWFs are particularly active in China. Their portfolio 
organizational structure allows SWFs to have a better separation of management and control 
thus mitigating the typical principal-principal agency conflict (Young et al., 2008) present in 
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state controlled firms. However, SWFs are reluctant to engage in active governance, 
especially when the portfolio firm is foreign (Fotak et al., 2013). To some extent this lack of 
involvement alleviates concerns that SWFs may pursue objectives other than profit 
maximization, such as political objectives or even tunneling (Jiang, Lee, & Yue, 2010).  
We have discussed non-equity mechanisms of political interference but several 
questions remain unanswered and invite future research. How are different forms of state 
control and state support interrelated? Can private firms compete with state-supported firms 
that receive privileged access to financial and other resources? Furthermore, scholars should 
differentiate between the different geographic regions or administrative levels when studying 
state control in such large and diverse economies as China and Russia as such studies remain 
rare. 
Dependence on the state creates opportunities for exercising influence beyond firms 
where the state is a shareholder. Through its leverage over key actors in business groups, the 
state can exercise influence over other business group members. Growth of such business 
groups meant that new firms were added to the network of interconnected private and state 
actors; joining this network brought these firms into the state’s sphere of influence (Guthrie, 
Okhmatovskiy, Schoenman, & Xiao, 2012). The role of the state in creating and promoting 
business groups in transition economies deserves more attention among scholars of state 
capitalism. Transaction cost theory may, for example, yield insights into the effects of such 
state interference on firm behavior. Conceptual analyses of the relative benefits to private 
actors of autonomous versus integrated forms of public-private partnerships (Kivleniece & 
Quelin, 2012) provide the basis for future empirical studies of private-public governance 
arrangements in transition economies. Further, the variety of private-public ownership forms 
we have identified may provide scope for the development of a more contingent approach to 
private-public sector governance. 
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Private and state actors are also connected through networks of political ties (Sun, 
Mellahi, & Wright, 2012; Danis, Chiaburu, & Lyles, 2010). Despite significant progress in 
building market institutions, political ties continue to play a critical role in transition 
economies. The political embeddedness perspective emphasizes that connections with 
politicians serving an instrumental function for the firm can also be leveraged by these 
politicians to constrain firms’ strategic choices, while state control ties also provide firms 
with an opportunity to influence state actors. Given the prominence of political ties in China 
and Russia, it is not surprising that most studies about political embeddedness have been 
conducted in these transition economies (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010; 
Sun, Mellahi, Wright, & Xu, forthcoming). The importance of political connections does not 
necessarily decline with the development of market institutions (Michelson, 2007; Shi, 
Markoczy, & Stan, 2014) because of the impact of multiple contingency factors (Peng & 
Zhou, 2005; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012). Recent developments emphasize both the roles 
of political tie heterogeneity (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2014) and 
the interrelationships between personal-level and ownership-related political ties (Kilduff & 
Brass, 2010). Further research built upon political embeddedness perspective is needed to 
examine the implications of these relationships for the governance of firms in transition 
economies. For example, research might examine how voluntary or forced departures of 
politically-connected executives and external board members influence governance through 
changes to the nature of personal versus organizational level political ties.     
It is difficult to capture mechanisms of informal influence in empirical studies. 
Studies have usually relied on self-reported evidence obtained through surveys of top 
managers (Yakovlev, 2009). Unlike state ownership or state representatives on boards, phone 
calls from top government officials to CEOs cannot be traced by researchers, but these might 
be as consequential as formal mechanisms of state control. However, even with limited 
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empirical evidence, we can estimate the importance of informal state influence in transition 
economies as a function of firms’ dependence on decisions made by state officials. 
Preferential treatment and selective punitive actions are frequently observed in transition 
economies, implying that state officials have plenty of opportunities to exercise influence 
over firms using informal mechanisms. Further research on such mechanisms is needed to 
complement existing evidence on formal mechanisms of state control – this is essential for 
understanding how the state exercises control over firms in transition economies. 
Corporate Governance Structures and Processes  
According to the resource-based view (Makhija, 2003; Lazzarini, 2015), an important issue is 
not just the monitoring role of boards but also the value adding role of directors due to their 
human and social capital. Research on the role of directors’ international experience in 
transition economies remains limited. Further research is needed on the extent to which 
transition economy firms recruit overseas directors or expatriates, who can provide the 
international expertise required. Studies have emphasized the importance of board 
connections to government agencies, but we have little analysis of the evolution of these 
relationships. Expectations that the relevance of such social capital would decline over time 
need to be examined through longitudinal studies of board composition and processes. 
Important questions concern the extent to which social capital associated with political ties 
has declined or metamorphosed over time. 
There is relatively little analysis of how state involvement on boards affects board 
processes. Notwithstanding challenges regarding access to board operations, which 
researchers in developed economies have overcome (Pye, 2013), fine-grained studies of 
board processes in firms operating with different configurations of state control will likely be 
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highly insightful. Finally, studies of board interlocks involving networks of SOEs and private 
firms (Salvaj & Couyoumdjian, 2015) could be validated in transition economies. 
SOEs can outsource regulation of corporate governance practices to developed 
economies by listing on foreign exchanges or by acquiring foreign assets. Several studies on 
cross-listings of foreign firms on Western exchanges observe improved corporate governance 
standards and performance of foreign firms as they ‘bond’ to a better governance and 
regulatory regime (Khanna, Palepu, & Srinivasan, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2002; Bell, 
Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014), but more empirical research is needed to test the boundaries 
of bonding theory in the context of SOEs in transition economies. As more SOEs from 
transition economies get listed on foreign exchanges, future studies could explore corporate 
governance impact across institutional regimes of these stock exchanges. For example, how 
does the selection of market tier between main, secondary or lower tier impact SOE’s 
corporate governance? Would listing on London Stock Exchange improve corporate 
governance of an SOE in the same way as listing under a different corporate governance 
regime, such as Singapore Exchange or Frankfurt Stock Exchange? Institutional analysis 
would help differentiate between formal stock exchange rules and informal rules or 
enforcement mechanisms that firms are subject to in practice. Such analysis could be linked 
to internationalization of SOEs through FDI, acquisitions or joint ventures (Liang et al., 2015; 
Choudhury & Khanna, 2014; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; 
Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014; Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; White, 2000; Zeng, Douglas, 
& Wu, 2013) as moderating effects of foreign listings. Further, the role of foreign MNEs 
entering transition economies as agents of change in state control and corporate governance 
(Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003) may be a fruitful avenue to explore.  
Outsourcing corporate governance regulation may increase accountability and 
transparency as most SOEs adopted IFRS standards and appointed international audit firms 
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(Grosman & Leiponen, 2013). Researchers could compare transparency and disclosure 
practices of SOEs in transition economies and developed economies using institutional theory 
since the nature of such practices may be affected by institutional environment. Specific areas 
for study might include misrepresenting financial results or withholding information about 
shareholders’ identities and board members’ backgrounds and affiliations (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2011). 
There is a shortage of research on Top Management Team (TMT) selection and 
compensation in SOEs, primarily due to data scarcity and non-disclosure. However, we see 
the following trends emerging regarding TMT selection mechanisms: 1) appointment of 
trusted state officials to top management positions, making them ultra-powerful state 
‘nominees’; 2) appointments of the new generation of sophisticated managers who learned 
about business in the world’s best business schools, worked abroad and were exposed to 
better governance practices and business ethics than their predecessors (Wooldridge, 2012). 
However, the latter category of managers may only fulfill technical or operational roles, with 
decision making being made at the level of state shareholder.  
Future studies should consider how SOEs can attract new talent given competition 
with compensation and benefits offered by domestic private firms and MNEs. Further 
research can explore how equity-linked long-term incentives of top managers influence 
decision making at SOEs. A formal theory is needed to distinguish the use of equity-linked 
compensation to solve principal–agent problems from the use of such compensation to 
resolve conflicting interests of state and private shareholders. 
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Contextual Factors 
Transition economies were not homogeneous in 1989 and are even less homogeneous now. 
Some have progressed to become EU members, while others have progressed little or even 
regressed after initial reforms. This variety is vividly illustrated in Hoskisson et al.’s (2013) 
analysis that categorizes emerging economies, including transition economies, into five 
different clusters according to their institutional and infrastructure development. Further 
research is needed to analyze the relationships between the evolution of state control and 
institutional development. For example, recent studies demonstrate how home country 
institutional contextual factors complement or substitute for director human and social capital 
(Lu et al., 2014) and there is a need to apply this analysis to the role of state directors.        
In transition economies, managers have relied excessively on informal institutions due 
to weak formal institutions. Continuing reliance on informal institutions under conditions of 
formal institutional voids creates major obstacles for badly needed reforms (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2011). A specific contextual issue requiring further analysis concerns the problem 
of corruption in the governance of firms with some element of state control. Governments in 
transition economies have made moves to tackle corruption by removing and imprisoning 
implicated government officials, often after changes in ruling cliques. Such changes will 
affect firms closely connected to the former officials. Analyses of the effects of removing 
corrupt officials and politicians on the firms closely associated with them would likely yield 
interesting insights. Such issues suggest scope for the development and application of 
political embeddedness and institutional perspectives.  
CONCLUSION 
Twenty five years on from 1989, SOEs in transition economies are far from the centrally-
planned behemoths and state control has evolved into different organizational and 
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governance forms. Recent studies on state controlled firms in transition economies, other than 
China and Russia, are rare. This omission is unfortunate since these economies have become 
more diverse and continue to change. We encourage context-specific research on SOEs to 
understand the evolution of state control in particular countries, as well as comparative 
research, which can provide insights into whether state capitalism varies between transition 
economies. If so, insights generated are context-bound. Both context-specific and 
comparative studies could provide opportunities to extend mainstream theory by examining 
interfaces between theory and context, by both contextualizing theory and theorizing about 
context. With this review, we lay the foundation for such further examination.     
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TABLE 1 
Positive and Negative Effects of State Control According to Different Theoretical Perspectives 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Negative effects of state 
control 
Forms of state control that can 
minimize its negative effects 
Positive effects of state control Forms of state control that can 
maximize its positive effects 
Agency theory State as principal provides 
weak monitoring. Not clear 
who acts as principal on 
behalf of state. Soft budget 
constraints create weak 
incentives for managers as 
agents. 
Active state involvement in CG. 
Creation of asset management 
companies to manage state assets 
defines principal responsible for 
monitoring. Firms with partial state 
ownership benefit from diligent 
monitoring by private investors.  
Under conditions of entrenched 
management and diffused ownership, 
state shareholders can exercise 
influence over management even 
with relatively small stake. 
State ownership accompanied by CG 
mechanisms enabling effective control. 
Transaction cost 
economics 
State control increases costs 
of transacting by increasing 
risk that firm may not fulfill 
contract obligations due to 
politically motivated 
interference. 
Partial state ownership gives private 
shareholders enough influence to 
prevent unilateral decision-making by 
state shareholders. Indirect state 
ownership isolates political actors 
from direct involvement in CG.  
State control decreases costs of 
transacting by reducing risk of 
fraudulent behavior on behalf of 
firms. 
State ownership accompanied by CG 
mechanisms enabling active 
involvement of state shareholders in 
monitoring. 
Institutional 
theory 
Performing simultaneously 
functions of regulator and 
owner of economic actors 
creates conflicts of interest. 
Isolating state agencies acting as 
shareholders from state agencies 
acting as regulators. 
State control solves some problems 
associated with institutional voids. 
State leverages control over firms 
when acting as "institutional 
entrepreneur". 
State ownership accompanied by CG 
mechanisms enabling monitoring. 
Regulations enabling “institutional 
entrepreneurship” by state-controlled 
firms. 
Industrial policy 
perspective 
More opportunities for 
corruption. Obstacles created 
for independent firms 
competing with state-
supported industry 
champions. 
Partial state ownership gives private 
shareholders influence to prevent 
unilateral decision-making by state 
shareholders. Regulations that protect 
private firms in industries dominated 
by state-supported firms. 
State control enables implementation 
of industrial policy through 
coordination of investments made by 
state-supported industry champions. 
Transparent CG mechanisms to be used 
by the state for coordinating firms 
receiving state support.  
Resource-based 
view 
Endowment with state 
resources makes state-
controlled firms reluctant to 
develop skills to obtain these 
resources without state 
support. 
Providing managers of state-
controlled firms with sufficient 
autonomy and creating strong 
incentives to focus on increasing 
competitiveness of their firms. 
State-controlled firms benefit from 
access to valuable resources 
belonging to state. 
CG mechanisms engaging state as 
shareholder increase chances of gaining 
access to state resources. Regulation that 
constrains potential corruption 
associated with distribution of these 
resources. 
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Political 
embeddedness 
perspective 
Political connections that 
firms use to obtain benefits 
from the state also constrain 
firms’ strategic choices. 
Formalization of state expectations 
and high transparency of governance 
process limit politicians’ ability to 
exercise informal influence over 
firms’ strategic choices. 
Political connections facilitate firms’ 
access to valuable resources 
controlled by state. 
Formalization of state commitment to 
provide state-affiliated firms with 
privileged access to resources. 
Regulation that constrains potential 
corruption associated with distribution 
of state resources. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Key Studies Representing Different Theoretical Perspectives 
 Author(s) (Year) Theory Data  Key findings Empirical 
setting 
1. Sun, Mellahi, 
Wright & Xu 
(forthcoming) 
PE 154 firms listed on Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Event 
study analysis surrounding removal of the 
Communist Party Chief in Shanghai in 
2006. 
An unanticipated high profile political event triggers a negative 
stock market evaluation effect of managerial ties to municipal 
government, but the effect of government ownership ties is 
insignificant. Companies combining managerial and ownership 
ties experienced less post-shock reduction in market value than 
those holding only managerial political ties.  
China 
2.  Chen (2015) AT World Bank survey of 2,400 public and 
private firms across 18 Chinese cities 
2003.  
Weaker helping hand from government associated with higher 
number and proportion of outsiders on board. 
China 
3.  Cull, Li, Sun, & 
Xu (2015) 
AT World Bank 120 city survey of 12,400 
Chinese manufacturing firms conducted in 
2005.  
Government connections associated with substantially less severe 
financial constraints.  
China 
4. Liang, Ren, & 
Sun (2015) 
AT, IT, IP 2,394 listed non-financial Chinese firms, 
80% market capitalization of which are 
SOEs, 2001-2011, Datastream, WIND, 
CSMAR, and CCER 
Diminishing effect of executive political connections and 
increasing effect of state ownership control on globalization 
decisions and degree of globalization of SOEs with full or partial 
state ownership. 
China 
5.  Lin, Tan, Zhao & 
Karim (2015) 
AT All firms with listed A-shares on Shenzhen 
or Shanghai stock exchange 2005-2009. 
Publicly available data.  
Firms spending resources to bond with new government via CSR 
activities receive higher levels of government subsidies or have 
greater propensity to receive future government subsidies. They 
outperform firms not investing in political networking via CSR. 
China 
6.  Qian & Yeung 
(2015) 
AT All Chinese listed firms 1995–2009. 
Chinese Security Market Research 
(CSMAR) database. 
Controlling shareholders' tunneling activity positively associated 
with firms' state owned bank loan access. 
China 
7.  Li, Cui, & Lu 
(2014) 
IT, IP 16 illustrative case examples from South 
East Asia and China 
Restructuring of central SOEs into “national champions” exposes 
them to stronger institutional pressures from home and host 
country governments; local SOEs with fewer obligations to serve 
national strategic prerogatives display greater managerial 
autonomy and market orientation. 
South East 
Asia and 
China  
8.  Meyer, Ding, Li, IT 386 foreign investments of listed Chinese SOEs face more complex institutional pressures in host countries China 
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& Zhang (2014) firms 2009, public data.  than private firms, adapting mode and control decisions 
differently. 
9. Zheng, Singh & 
Mitchell (2014) 
RBV, PE 280 television manufacturing firms in 
China, 1993-2003. China Statistical 
Yearbook and the China Electronics 
Industry Yearbook.  
Political ties to local governments improve both firm survival 
(“buffering”) and performance (“enabling”); central ties do not 
provide buffering or enabling benefits. Effects contingent upon 
prior performance. 
China 
10. Zeng, Douglas 
and Wu (2013) 
IT, RBV Chinese beer industry, 1995-2004 (661 
firms 1995 and 231 in 2004, and 93 
acquisitions). 70% founded as SOEs; 
CNBS.  
Firms founded as SOEs or COEs (Collectively Owned 
Enterprises) desire acquisition, unless have undertaken multiple 
changes, or attracted more private investment. Acquisition 
likelihood has U-shaped relationship with investment in 
marketing resources. 
China 
11. Chernykh (2011) AT 153 privately-controlled firms, 2003. Formerly privatized and domestically-owned companies in 
strategically important sectors face highest risks of transfers from 
private to state control. Renationalization not driven by firm 
profitability. 
Russia 
12. Wang, Guthrie, & 
Xiao (2011). 
IT Chinese listed firms, 1994-2003. Analysis of how SASAC impacts ownership concentration and 
allows firm owners to monitor and stabilize firm behavior. 
China 
13. Okhmatovskiy 
(2010)  
PE 450 Russian banks 2001, 640 banks 2002, 
and 555 banks 2003, Central Bank of 
Russia, Interfax and financial statements. 
Banks demonstrate higher profitability when they have ties to 
SOEs but not when they have direct ties to state agencies. 
Russia 
14. Sun, Mellahi, & 
Thun (2010) 
PE Qualitative case study based on 142 
interviews, Chinese automotive industry, 
1980-2005 
Declining, and even negative, value of deep political 
embeddedness by MNEs in a politically stable host emerging 
economy. 
China 
15. Chernykh (2008)  AT Russian listed firms. Federal and regional governments’ control is exercised through 
elaborate pyramid structures. 
Russia 
16. Fan, Wong & 
Zhang (2007) 
AT 790 newly partially privatized firms in 
China, covering 7,255 CEOs and directors, 
1993-2001. IPO prospectuses and other 
public sources.  
Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those 
without and have poorer growth. Firms led by politically 
connected CEOs more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the 
board rather than directors with relevant professional 
backgrounds. 
China 
17. Ralston, Terpstra-
Tong, Terpstra, 
Wang, & Egri 
(2006) 
Competing 
values of 
organizational 
culture 
Survey of 435 SOEs, private-owned 
enterprises, and foreign-controlled 
businesses in manufacturing, 2001 and 
2002. 
SOEs in China have transitioned from their pre-reform culture 
into market-oriented one.  
China 
18. Uhlenbruck, RBV, Theoretical models leading to normative Privatized SOEs improve learning ability by actively searching Central and 
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Meyer & Hitt 
(2003) 
Organizational 
learning 
propositions for information in product and factor markets rather than relying 
on information provided by established networks. They should 
also adapt organizational structure to allow for more efficient 
information processing by integrating resources to achieve 
strategic fit. 
Eastern 
Europe 
19. Thun (2004) IP China’s automotive industry case studies Industrial policy by the state to regulate and control certain types 
of FDI resulted in firms under state control tightly integrated into 
global production networks. 
China 
20. Ferguson, Lam & 
Lee (2002) 
Cost-benefit 
framework 
145 Hong Kong stock exchange firms, 
1995-96. 
Chinese formerly wholly owned SOEs cross-listed on Hong Kong 
stock exchange disclose more information than other firms listed 
in China.  
China 
21. Filatotchev, Buck 
& Zhukov (2000) 
AT Medium and large industrial firms; 
questionnaire interviews 1997/1998.  
Downsizing following privatization influenced by corporate 
governance and institutional change caused by business crisis. 
CIS 
22. White (2000) TCE, RBV, and 
RDT 
China’s pharmaceutical SOEs 1985-94. SOEs’ M&A decisions are outcomes of a simultaneous 
consideration of external competitive and internal capabilities-
related factors. 
China 
23. Cao, Qian & 
Weingast (1999) 
IP Business history narrative Privatization and reforms in China driven by the federal 
government. 
China 
24. Claessens & 
Djankov (1999) 
AT 706 Czech firms, 1992-1997.  Firm productivity and profitability increases with ownership 
concentration contingent upon state and other types of ownership. 
Czech 
Republic 
25. Brouthers & 
Bamossy (1997) 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Case studies of eight dyads of Western 
European and Central / Eastern European 
firms 
Transitional governments intervene at different stages of 
negotiation process and can change the balance of power, 
sometimes to detriment of their own SOEs. 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
Review studies are not included. Abbreviations: AT - agency theory, TCE - transaction cost economics, IT - institutional theory, RBV - resource-based view, IP - industrial 
policy, PE - political embeddedness, RDT – resource dependence theory. 
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TABLE 3  
Events that Affected State Control and Corporate Governance in China during last 25 Years 
Year Event What has changed as the result of this event Implications for state control and corporate governance 
1990-
1991 
Shanghai stock exchange 
opens in December 1990,  
Shenzhen stock exchange 
opens in July 1991 
Organized share trading makes it easy for companies to sell 
shares and for investors to buy shares. Category of minority 
shareholders dramatically expanded to include different types 
of return-seeking investors.  
Principal reason for opening Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
was to provide an opportunity for SOEs to raise funds. By selling shares 
to private investors the state diluted its holdings in SOEs. 
1992 CSRC established 
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) an 
analogue of U.S. SEC. The CSRC formulates and enforces 
rules regulating how securities are issued and traded.  
CSRC gradually gained significant influence as an independent 
regulatory agency that reports directly to the State Council. CSRC 
regulations restrict state shareholders in how they exercise control. 
1993-
1994 
Company Law passed in 
December 1993, effective 
since July 1994 
Company Law formulated general rules applying to all limited 
liability companies and joint stock corporations. 
Once corporatized, SOEs fall under jurisdiction of the Company Law. 
The state, as the main shareholder, is constrained by this Law in how it 
exercises control over SOEs (and has to respect rights of private 
minority shareholders). 
2001 Accession to WTO Substantial increase in foreign investments into sectors that 
used to be closed for foreign ownership. 
SOEs become partners of foreign investors in newly-created joint 
ventures, exposing SOEs to technologies and management practices of 
foreign partners. 
2002 Code of Corporate 
Governance issued  
Code provides general non-mandatory guidelines addressing 
most important aspects of corporate governance; companies 
are expected to disclose information about non-compliance.  
Code requires that independent directors play an important role so that 
they potentially may prevent unilateral control of the board by state 
representatives.   
2003 Removing restrictions on 
ownership of A-shares by 
domestic shareholders 
only  
Qualified foreign institutional investors permitted to invest in 
A-shares, expanding significantly the number of companies 
that could be potential investment targets for foreign 
institutional investors. 
Range of SOEs exposed to foreign institutional investors expands from 
107 companies that issued B-shares to all traded companies. Number of 
companies where state shareholders have to interact with foreign 
shareholders increases dramatically. 
2003 SASAC established Companies previously owned directly by state agencies now 
owned by State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). SASAC oversees 
SOEs on behalf of the State Council (Central Government). 
SASAC becomes intermediary between central government agencies 
and SOEs thus decreasing politically-motivated interventions in 
corporate governance of SOEs.   
2005 Conversion of non-
tradable shares into 
tradable shares 
Before 2005 companies would have two classes of shares: 
tradable and non-tradable shares. Most shares were non-
tradable. 
Once non-tradable shares are converted into tradable shares, state 
shareholders (and top executives appointed by state shareholders) 
become interested in increasing share price as shares now potentially 
can be sold for profit. 
2008 - 
2012 
State support after the 
global financial crisis 
helped SOEs to gain 
ground over private 
companies 
As companies felt effects of 2008 worldwide financial crisis, 
Chinese state focused on providing support to SOEs, while 
refusing to provide similar support to private enterprises. 
SOEs expand operations at expense of private enterprises (the process 
described as “guo jin min tui” or "the state advances, the private sector 
retreats"). 
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TABLE 4 
Events that Affected State Control and Corporate Governance in Russia during Last 25 Years 
Year Event What has changed as the result of this event Implications for state control and corporate governance 
 
1987-
1988 
USSR law on state 
enterprises (effective 1988) 
Creating legal basis for operation of SOEs as relatively 
autonomous economic actors.  
State retains full control over SOEs, but managers of SOEs granted 
more autonomy. With launch of perestroika SOE managers are 
encouraged to take initiative and assume responsibility for enterprise 
performance.   
1990-
1991 
Laws on ownership, 
enterprises, and banking 
(1990); law on privatization 
(1991) enacted 
Creating legal basis for operation of enterprises with 
different forms of ownership, including private 
ownership and state ownership. Creating legal basis for 
privatization. 
SOEs for the first time face competition from privately-owned firms. 
1992-
1994 
Mass privatization Voucher privatization begins 1992. Monetary 
privatization begins 1994. 
State releases control over SOEs in sectors not considered strategic. 
Some completely privatized, others – partially privatized. 
1995 Loans-for-shares 
privatization begins 
Privatization of large enterprises in most attractive 
sectors of the Russian economy through “loans-for-
shares” auctions. 
State releases control over some “jewels” of the national economy, 
most engaged in extraction of natural resources and generating 
significant revenues from export. 
1996 Law on Corporations and 
Law on Securities are 
enacted 
Creating legal basis for operation of stock markets. Large partially-privatized SOEs become blue chips of Russian stock 
market while state retained majority stakes. 
1998 Financial crisis, default on 
government debt 
Government default and devaluation of ruble led to sharp 
decline in imports and prompted development of local 
producers.    
Many SOEs on verge of bankruptcy since mid-1990s benefited from 
increasing demand for local products after 1998 crisis - became viable, 
made investments, but needed to improve efficiency. 
2000 Putin’s first term as 
President begins 
Under Putin, trend of “state capture” by oligarchs 
reversed; soon after Putin’s election several influential 
oligarchs fled Russia, others expressed willingness to 
cooperate. 
State begins to reassert control over economy largely lost under Yeltsin. 
State shareholders remained passive in the 1990s but after 2000 state 
began to leverage its rights as a major shareholder and assumed a more 
active role in corporate governance. 
2002 Corporate Governance Code 
enacted 
Russian Corporate Governance Code provided detailed 
guidelines, officially endorsed by the government. Not 
mandatory, but publicly traded companies required to 
report and explain non-compliance. 
Code of Corporate Governance formulates standards of good corporate 
governance targeting primarily publicly traded companies including 
companies with partial state ownership. Recommends mechanisms 
preventing controlling shareholders from taking actions harming 
interests of minority shareholders. Such policies constrain control by 
state as majority shareholder. 
2003 Arrest of Yukos’s largest 
shareholder Khodorkovsky, 
Arrest of Khodorkovsky, the wealthiest Russian in 2003, 
demonstrated toughness of Putin’s administration toward 
Assets of Yukos purchased by state-controlled Rosneft. Expansion of 
state-controlled companies through purchasing assets from private 
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re-nationalization of Yukos 
begins 
non-loyal oligarchs, after which no other oligarchs 
explicitly opposed Putin’s policies. 
companies continued, with proportion of total market capitalization 
accounted for by SOEs increasing from 20% in 2003 to 50% in 2010. 
2006 -
2007 
IPOs of Rosneft (2006) and 
VTB (2007) on LSE 
Two large Russian corporations with majority state 
ownership conducted IPOs on London Stock Exchange 
attracting significant interest of foreign investors. 
SOEs interested in attracting foreign investors through IPOs at foreign 
stock exchanges improved corporate governance practices to comply 
with standards expected by foreign investors.  
2007 Establishment of state-
controlled “national 
corporations” 
State corporations “Rosnanotech” and “Rostekhnologii” 
are established. 
“National corporations” consolidate state-controlled assets in high-tech 
industries and channel funds allocated for development of technology-
intensive businesses.   
2011 Removing high-ranked 
government officials from 
boards of SOEs 
Replacing significant proportion of state representatives 
on boards with independent directors and attorneys 
voting according to government directives. 
Initiative intended to demonstrate de-politicization of governance of 
SOEs. In practice did not increase autonomy of SOEs because lower 
ranked government officials retained director positions and voted 
according to directives received from top level officials. 
2012 Russia joins WTO Liberalization of trade: 500 legal measures adopted, 
amended or modified to bring legal regime into 
conformity with the WTO rules. Russia agreed that 
SOEs participate in international trade in a manner 
consistent with the WTO regulations. Russia took steps 
to eliminate special privileges for many SOEs.  
WTO challenges some government policies and actions involving 
SOEs. In 2015, US opposed new resolutions that would authorize 
Russian government to frame procurement plans or tender rules to 
effectively require SOEs to purchase Russian goods only as inconsistent 
with Russia's WTO obligations.  
2014 New version of Corporate 
Governance Code introduced 
The revised version of the Code contains stricter 
corporate governance requirements compared with the 
original version. 
Top government officials, including Prime-Minister Medvedev, 
emphasize that SOEs should make special efforts to comply with 
requirements of the new Code. 
2014 Crimea conflict Trade wars between Russia and EU; international 
sanctions imposed by US and EU; weak ruble.  
SOEs in oil, gas, and defense industries suffered from the imposed 
sanctions. 
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TABLE 5  
Transition Economies: Agenda for Further Research 
State Control 
Theme Research questions 
State Control 
through 
Ownership 
What are the impacts of different forms of state ownership and affiliation on governance, strategy and performance?   
How have different forms of state ownership and affiliation evolved? Is this evolution unidirectional away from state involvement? 
How are the interests of private and public shareholders reconciled? 
How do corporate governance bundles vary between different forms of state ownership and affiliation? 
What are the forms of indirect state ownership and how do these impact governance and performance? 
What new forms of state ownership and affiliation are emerging and how do their forms of control vary? 
How does state ownership vary across geographic regions and administrative levels (i.e. federal vs. municipal)? 
Means of State 
Control beyond 
Ownership 
How do channels of state non-equity control and support differ from each other and what is their impact? 
What are the implications for private firms’ ability to compete with state-supported firms and SOEs receiving financial and other resources from the 
state? 
Networks of 
Private and State 
Actors 
What is the nature of private-public governance mechanisms and networks and what is their impact? 
How does the variety of private-public ownership forms relate to different approaches to private-public sector governance? 
How does personal and organizational embeddedness in specific political networks influence governance? How does this change when executives and 
board members change? 
Evolution of State 
Control 
How has state ownership and control of enterprises evolved in different types of transition economies and what has been the impact upon enterprises 
in these economies? 
Corporate Governance 
Theme Research questions 
Boards To what extent do transition economy state-owned and controlled firms recruit overseas directors or expatriates who can provide the expertise 
required? 
How do the dimensions of board diversity (political/commercial, gender, age/experience, etc.) differ in firms with different configurations of state 
control? 
What board roles do politically connected directors play in different types of state-owned and affiliated enterprises? 
What is the pattern of political and commercial expertise in Chair and CEO board roles?  
To what extent does duality of Chair and CEO vary between different forms of state ownership and affiliation? 
What is the nature of board turnover and its drivers in different types of state ownership and affiliation? 
To what extent does social capital of state directors evolve (for example, decline or metamorphose) with the progress of market reforms? 
How does the nature of board processes in firms with different configurations of state control vary? 
Outsourcing of 
Corporate 
Governance 
Regulation 
How does the selection of market tier at foreign stock exchanges impact SOE’s corporate governance and performance? How does the country in 
which the stock exchange is located affect implications of the foreign listing?   
How do different formal stock exchange rules and informal enforcement mechanisms impact corporate governance and performance of SOEs listed at 
foreign stock exchanges?   
Page 44 of 45Corporate Governance:  An International Review
Corporate Governance:  An International Review
45 
 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
What are the similarities and differences in transparency and disclosure practices between different transition economies and developed economies? 
What drives these differences? 
How does the enforcement and application of transparency and disclosure practices vary between different transition economies? 
How does the enforcement and application of transparency and disclosure practices vary between different types of state ownership / affiliation and 
private sector enterprises? 
Executive 
Compensation 
How does executive compensation in state-owned / affiliated enterprises in transition economies differ from executive compensation in non-state 
firms and in enterprises from non-transition economies?  
How does the status of state-owned / affiliated enterprises in transition economies affect the scope of executive compensation mechanisms available? 
Evolution of 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
How have governance mechanisms and processes evolved in state-owned / affiliated enterprises in different types of transition economies and what 
has been the impact upon enterprises in these economies? 
To what extent do the presence and roles of politically connected directors in state-owned / affiliated enterprises change as transition economies 
evolve? 
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